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RATIONALES FOR TENANT
PROTECTION AND SECURITY OF TENURE
Gary Yee*
1. INTRODUCTION
Most people are exposed to the residential rental market during some
part of their lives.1 For the tenant, the product or service which is
being supplied by the landlord constitutes the tenant's home. In this
sense, the transactions that occur between landlords and tenants can
be as important as those that occur in an employment relationship.
The effects are very personal, substantial and direct. Therefore, it is
not surprising to see that government action in the rental housing
market is widespread.
This paper seeks to examine the issue of protection for residential
tenants. It is limited to issues of quality regulation, as opposed to price
regulation. There is ample literature of this latter aspect of rent con-
trol. Furthermore, the focus will be on one major aspect of quality-
security of tenure or protection against eviction.
After a general discussion of quality regulation, there will be a brief
overview of relevant aspects of the rental housing market. Then the ra-
tionales for intervention in this market will be analyzed, from both
economic and ethical perspectives. It will be seen that the rental hous-
ing market is far from an ideal competitive market. In addition, since
housing may be seen as a fundamental need, there are also ethical
reasons for intervention. The various forms of intervention which
should be taken will be discussed. The current state of law and policy
in Ontario will be examined, along with alternatives. Finally, the ef-
fects of the government action will be considered and evaluated.
* Copyright * 1989 Gary Yee. Gary Yee is a lawyer and Executive Director of
Metro Toronto Chinese and Southeast Asian Legal Clinic, Toronto.
1. In 1983, 36 per cent of households in Ontario were rental ones. This was up
from 26 per cent in 1956. See S.V. Fram, "Philosophy and Structure of Part IV
of the Landlord and Tenant Act", in Law Society of Upper Canada, Depart-
ment of Education, Residential Tenancies (Toronto: LSUC, 1985) Al at AS.
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2. REGULATION OF QUALITY
In a market, goods or services are exchanged. The government may
decide to regulate the exchange or the goods or services in many ways.
Two major aspects are price and quality. Price or economic regulation
has traditionally been aimed at monopolistic situations. Quality or so-
cial regulation has flourished more recently in many areas such as en-
vironmental pollution, occupational health and safety, misleading
advertising and consumer protection.2
The analysis of any government regulation should take two steps.
First, what is the reason for government action? Second, if the reason
is compelling enough, what form of action should be taken? The first
step may be re-phrased in terms of a threshold issue - is there a case
for government intervention? However, this economic perspective may
presuppose that the lack of "intervention" in a market is the ideal
situation 3 and that government intervention is needed only when the
market economy has somehow failed in the particular situation. It has
been noted that a competitive free market economy is itself possible
only through government action to enforce and protect contractual
rights and private property rights. 4
The issue of whether there are good reasons for government action is
not a strictly economical question. There are also ethical or normative
reasons why the government should act in some cases. These entail
value judgments which should be made explicit. Even the apparently
objective economic framework is predicated on some value-laden as-
sumptions of what is fair or best. However, the evaluation of govern-
ment action cannot be divorced totally from some form of cost-benefit
analysis. Furthermore, economic analysis can assist in predicting the
effects of various alternative forms of regulation.
Apart from the economic and ethical frameworks, which will be con-
sidered further, there is a third perspective which is not really
developed in this paper. This is the political or predictive framework
2. D.N. Dewees, G.F. Matheson & MJ. Trebileock, "The Rationale for Govern-
ment Regulation of Quality", in D.N. Dewees, ed, The Regulation of Quality
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1985) at 3; excerpts in MJ. Trebilcock, Social Regulation
(Toronto: Osgoode Hall Law School, 1987).
3. W.T. Stanbury, The Normative Bases of Goventment Action (Toronto: The Com-
mission of Inquiry into Residential Tenancies, 1985) 1.
4. ]bid.
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which is used to help understand why certain policies may or may not
be adopted by the government.
The forms of government action or intervention can be very diverse.
It may range from the provision or regulation of information to the ex-
treme of direct provision of the product or service by government. In
between are measures such as the creation of civil liability, the use of
taxes or subsidies and the direct regulation or standard-setting for the
quality of the product or service.5
In the residential tenancies context, the government has taken many
types of action that may be explained on an economic basis, ethical
basis or purely political basis. These actions include rent regulation,
public housing, subsidies, creation of landlord and tenant rights and
obligations (concerning repair, security of tenure, etc.), zoning and
land use controls, health standards, construction standards, property
standards and so forth. The rental market is also affected by general
government housing policies of all kinds, such as those related to en-
couraging co-ops or encouraging home ownership.
Some of the government action is aimed intentionally at price - that
is, making housing more affordable to the tenant. Other policies may
be directed at improving that quality of the tenancy. The main focus
of this paper will be on government action that affects one crucial
aspect of the quality of accommodation for tenants - security of
tenure.
3. RENTAL ACCOMMODATION - CHARACTERISTICS
Before considering the rationales for intervention from the economic
and ethical perspectives, it is helpful to take a brief look at the nature
of rental accommodation and, more specifically, the rental market in
Ontario.
The dimensions of the rental housing market are shown by the fact
that over a third of Ontario's households are rental ones.6 In Toronto,
the proportion is 43.5 per cent.7 The 1981 census shows over one mil-
5. D.N. Dewees, G.F. Matheson & MJ. Trebilcock, "Policy Alternatives in Quality
Regulation", in D.N. Dewees, ed, The Regulation of Quality (Toronto: Butter-
worths, 1985) at 27.
6. Fram, supra, note 1 at AS.
7. See 1981 Census Figures in The Canadian World Almanac and Book of Facts
1987 (Toronto: Global Press, 1986) at 274.
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lion rental households in the province.8 Therefore, it is evident that a
substantial segment of our population has a direct interest in the
regulation of this area.
Further statistics show the desperate situation which faces those who
are in the market looking for a place to rent. The 1987 vacancy rate in
Toronto was 0.1 per cent, the lowest rate in 20 years.9 A vacancy rate
of 3 or 4 per cent is considered normal.10 The average apartment
rented for $860 per month. 11 Since the widely accepted guideline for
accommodation expenditure is 25 per cent of income,12 this means a
household needed a yearly income of over $40,000 to rent the average
apartment in Toronto. Furthermore, it has been estimated that the
cheapest one-bedroom apartment that can be built would have to be
rented out at over $900 per month in order to break even. 13 High land
costs are a large part of the problem. 14
The affordability problem is obvious. The extent to which rent control
is a solution or itself part of the problem is not clear. The focus of this
paper is not on affordability or rent control. However, it will be noted
that low vacancy rates, unaffordable rents and the form of rent control
that exists (if any) can have some effect on the quality of housing, in-
cluding the security of tenure.
k
The housing market is a very complex one. Even in economic
terms, housing is acknowledged to be more than the four walls and
roof that constitute simple shelter. Housing is a bundle of services, of
which shelter is the most basic level. Housing also provides privacy,
8. Fram, supra, note 1 at A5.
9. "Why Metro needs special government help on low-cost housing" Toronto Star
(29 November 1987) BI.
10. "Toronto's vacancy rate lowest in nation at 0.1%" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail
(27 November 1987) B9.
11. Toronto Star, supra, note 9.
12. Ontario. The Commission of Inquiry into Residential Tenancies, Possible
Rationales for Rent Regulation by G. Fallis (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1984) at
26.
13. Toronto Star, supra, note 9.
14. Ibid.
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amenities, status, a source of recreation, a neighbourhood, and so
forth.15 In other words, housing provides a home and everything that
the word "home" conjures up, whether the home is a rented room or a
fully-owned mansion. As will be discussed later, this human element
of the housing market distinguishes it from the ordinary commodities
market. In the following section, more of the unique characteristics of
the rental accommodation market will come to light in the analysis of
whether the government should take action in this area, on economic
grounds or on ethical grounds.
4. RATIONALES FOR GOVERNMENT ACTION
A. ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK
From an economist's viewpoint, the government should intervene in a
market only if necessary to correct a defect or failure in the market.
The ideal of a perfectly competitive market is central to the economic
perspective. In such a market, exchanges would take place which
would lead to an efficient and optimal allocation of resources.16 In a
competitive market, no agent or group of agents would be able to in-
fluence prices; all agents would be equally well informed; there would
be negligible transaction costs; there would be no barriers to entry or
exist; there would be no externalities (all c6sts and benefits would be
internalized within the parties to the transaction). 17
Although few markets are perfectly competitive, it seems clear that the
rental accommodation market falls especially short of the ideal. The
focus of discussion below will be on defects that affect quality aspects
(for example, security of tenure) rather than rent or price aspects of
rental housing.
15. See F.A. Hayek et aL, Rent control - A Popular Paradox (Canada: The Fraser In-
stitute, 1975) at 38ff; see also Ontario, The Commission of Inquiry into Residen-
tial Tenancies, Market Imperfections and the Role of Rent Regulations in the
Residential Rental Market by J.D. Hulchanski (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1984) at
39; I.R.M. Gautreau, "Landlord's Responsibility for Criminal Attacks by
Strangers" (1986) 5:4 Advocates' Society 15.
16. The notion of Pareto optimal allocation of scarce resources, which would
occur in a perfect market, means that no one can be made any better off
without making at least one other person worse off. See Stanbury, supra, note 3
at 2.
17. Hulchanski, supra, note 15 at 31-32 and Stanbury, supra, note 3 C.2.
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One defect concerns the major transaction costs faced by a tenant
when he or she decides to or is forced to switch apartments. In the
perfect market, a tenant could freely choose to sleep in a different
apartment each night, depending on where the best deal could be ob-
tained.18 However, the costs of moving are very substantial and they
are not limited to merely pecuniary expenses. Most of the costs arise
out of the fact that the tenant is leaving his or her home. There is a
psychological loss because each housing unit is unique for each
tenant, even if it has all the same features. There is a loss connected
with inconvenience, having to adapt to an unfamiliar neighbourhood,
changing transportation routes to work and so forth. 19
Although these losses are hard to quantify in economic terms, their
significance must still be acknowledged. One study surveyed tenants to
determine the minimum that they would accept as monetary compen-
sation to move out 20 It showed that "tenants may experience a fairly
substantial loss in welfare if they have to move involuntarily." 21
Another aspect of the losses associated with moving is the time and
money that must be spent in the search- This is exacerbated during
times of low vacancy rates.
Transaction costs also exist for the landlord. Search costs for a new
tenant include advertisements, screening prospective tenants, showing
the apartment and possibly rental agency fees. There may also be ad-
ministrative costs in having leases drawn up, changing records or
cleaning and redecorating the apartment.22
18. R. Arnott, "The Effects of Rent Control: The Existing Literature", in Rent Con-
trol and Options for Decontrol in Ontario. (Toronto: Ontario Economic Council,
1981) 18 at 19-20; excerpt in MJ. Trebilcock, Social Regulation, (Toronto: Os-
goode Hall Law School, 1987).
19. Ontario, The Commission of Inquiry into Residential Tenancies, "Overview of
Alternative Rental Housing Policies" by J. Chant (Toronto: Queen's Printer,
1985) at 139; see also Institute of Law Research and Reform, Security of Tenure
(Edmonton: University of Alberta, 1975) at 5; Ontario, The Commission of In-
quiry into Residential Tenancies, "Residential Tenancies: Losses, Fairness and
Regulations" by J.L. Knetsch, D. Kahneman & P. McNeil (Toronto: Queen's
Printer, 1984) at 5ff; Hulchanski, supra, note 15 at 33.
20. Knetsch, supra, note 19.
21. Ibid. at 16. Many people would only accept $3000.00 or more as compensation
for moving.
22. Chant, supra, note 19 at 139 and Hulchanski, supra, note 15 at 33.
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The high transaction costs have an economic result - lack of mobility
and competition in the market. Furthermore, it is clear that the tenant
suffers far more loss in having to find and move to a new home that
the landlord suffers in having to find a new tenant. This puts the
landlord in a much stronger bargaining position with existing tenants.
They may not enforce their rights (legal or contractual) within the
relationship or they may not move even if a better deal is available
somewhere else. The landlord's transaction costs, though much less,
can also deter it from replacing existing tenants with new ones who
may be better tenants or willing to pay more. In addition, uncertainty
is a factor in maintaining this closed relationship. Both landlords and
tenants would rather not risk changing parties since the landlord and
tenant relationship is a continuing one of mutual (though usually une-
qual) dependence.
Lack of information or inherent uncertainty is a market failure be-
cause it can lead to inefficient allocations since decisions are not
made on full information. Tenants and landlords generally are not
well informed (or equally informed) about the market rents, apart-
ments available, condition of the apartment or how good the tenant
is.24
The unequal bargaining power also characterizes the relationship be-
tween the landlord and the prospective tenants, especially if the vacan-
cy rates is low. However, even without a low vacancy rate, the
prospective tenant interested in a certain apartment usually wants it
much more than the landlord wants that particular tenant. The
landlord's interest is mainly, if not solely, economic while the tenant's
interest is largely psychological. It has been noted that the housing
market is very heterogeneous with many different types of accom-
modation; there is no single market.2 5 Therefore, the supply available
to each tenant is actually much more limited than the vacancy rate
would suggest. The tenant has very limited possibilities for substitu-
tion.26
23. T. Honor, The Quest for Security: Employees, Tenants, Wives (London: Stevens and
Sons, 1982) at 105.
24. Fallis, supra, note 12 at 41.
25. Hulchanski, supra, note 15 at 35.
26. Knetsch, supra, note 19 at 2.
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Other factors that create an inelastic supply for housing include the
high capital cost involved in building, the fact that very durable goods
are involved (decisions have a very long-term effect), the long and ex-
pensive process of building and the immobility or fixed location of the
product.27 Therefore, any change in demand will likely be reflected in
large changes in price rather than supply. The difficulties on the supp-
ly side may be a rationale for rent regulation but that issue is beyond
the scope of this paper. The lack of supply is relevant for our purposes
to the extent that it affects the quality of rental accommodation (for
example, by decreasing the bargaining power of tenants).
It is widely acknowledged that equal bargaining power is a fiction in
landlord and tenant relationships if the vacancy rate is low,28 and
even if it isn't.29 Truly negotiated leases are very rare3" and the On-
tario Law Reform Commission has said that "the modem lease more
often represents a contract of adhesion than an individual contract
freely entered into."31
Unequal bargaining power may be seen as a market defect to the ex-
tent that it leads to monopolistic powers or lack of perfect competition.
The notions of exit and voice32 are very applicable to highlight this
situation. Exit is the ability to directly communicate your desires and
problems. Inefficiency results when there is a less-than-optimal use of
exit and voice.33 From the above discussion, it is clear that most
tenants find it difficult to leave or to complain and enforce their
rights. Employees are often in the same position.
27. Hulchanski, supra, note 15 at 34ff.
28. Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Report on Landlord and Tenant
Relationships; Residential Tenancies (Vancouver: L.R.C. of B.C., 1973) at 62
[hereinafter L.R.C. of B.C.]; and Institute of Law Research and Reform,
Residential Tenancies (Edmonton: University of Alberta, 1977) at 6.
29. Ontario Law Reform Commission, Interim Report on Landlord and Tenant Law
Applicable to Residential Tenancies (Toronto: department of the Attorney
General, 1968), at 43 [hereinafter OLRCj. See also Residential Tenancies (Alber-
ta), supra, note 28 at 7 and Knetsch, supra, note 19 at 1.
30. A. Weinrib, "The Ontario Landlord and Tenant Amendment Act" (1971), 21
U.T.LJ. 92 at 93.
31. O.L.R.C. supra, note 29 at 44.
32. F. Reid, Collective Bargaining for Tenants (Toronto: The Commission of Inquiry
into Residential Tenancies, 1984) at 6.
33. Ibid. at 8.
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A final market failure to consider is with respect to externalities. The
benefits of having good quality housing and happy, secure tenants ex-
tends beyond the immediate parties in the relationship. For example,
the whole neighbourhood benefits as well.34 Furthermore, as noted by
the Ontario Law Reform Commission, "the physical and psychological
effects of housing which is below reasonable standards of fitness have
become increasingly well known."35 The landlord who may be acting
within its contractual or property rights in keeping an apartment in
disrepair or arbitrarily evicting a tenant does not really bear any of the
resulting social costs. Therefore, inefficiency may occur because of
decisions being made without having to take into account all of the
relevant costs and benefits.
The failures in the rental accommodation market appear to be in-
herent features. High transaction costs and a weaker bargaining posi-
tion for tenants may justify government intervention on a strictly
economic basis, to try to correct the market. In view of the above dis-
cussion, the contention of the Fraser Institute that there is only a
poverty problem, and not a housing problem, does not seem viable. 6
Simply giving tenants more money will not correct the market. Various
forms of intervention will be discussed later.
The market failures involving high transaction costs and weak bar-
gaining position for tenants naturally have some impact on the quality
of rental housing, including habitability and security of tenure. The
impact of not having any security of tenure will be examined in more
detail below.
B. ETHICAL FRAMEWORK
Within the economic framework, some case has been made out for in-
tervention to correct the market if possible, but the form may be mini-
mal. The form of government action that should be taken in the
landlord and tenant relationship depends upon the ethical perspective
taken. Giving primacy to the economic framework is itself an indicator
of one's norms and values.
At one extreme, according to the common conception of anarchy,
there would be absolutely no government action. Indeed, there would
34. Chant, supra, note 19 at 139.
35. O.L.R.C. supra, note 29 at 42.
36. Hayek, supra, note 15 at xv.
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be no government and no laws. To the extent that private property
could still exist, apartments could be rented but there would be no
guarantee that the original terms of the lease (if any) would be fol-
lowed. Violence could result from attempts to evict a tenant.
With a more reasonable scenario, there would be a minimum level of
government action or laws in order to ensure the protection of private
property rights and the enforcement of contracts.37 This would form
the basis of market transactions. However, in this conception, there
may be no recognition of any market failures. Monopolies and une-
qual bargaining power could be allowed to flourish. Whatever alloca-
tion is made by the market would satisfy this view of distributive
justice.38
Most economists would favour government intervention to correct
market failures. However, the acceptance of the perfectly competitive
market as the ideal is very value-laden. There is a presumption of
rationality, some pre-existing set of preferences and a prior endow-
ment or wealth distribution which is just Furthermore, monetary
values tend to be attached to only some things and many social values
which cannot be or are not quantified would simply be ignored. The
neo-classical model of utilitarianism connected with economic
liberalism (and welfare economics) supports the idea of perfectly
functioning markets leading to the most efficient distribution and
maximization of welfare for all.39
Another ethical perspective is the social contract theory espoused by
Kant and later by Rawls 4°. In this view, the distribution of social and
economic goods generally should be equal because that is what in-
dividuals would have agreed to if they acted rationally under a "veil of
ignorance" about what their prospects or endowments would be in life.
Following this philosophy would lead to a "radical rejection of the
market as an institution capable by itself of producing a just distribu-
tion of benefits and burdens."41 However, this does not necessarily
mean that the market is abolished or that economic analysis is ig-
nored. But it does mean that the economic goals of efficiency and
37. For example, see discussion in R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York:
Basic Books, 1974).
38. Dewees, supra, note 2 at 16.
39. Ibid. at 17.
40. Ibid. at 17-18.
41. Ibid. at 18.
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maximization of material wealth will be balanced by or perhaps su-
perseded by the social goals related to this particular ethical perspec-
tive.
Our society does not appear to favour general egalitarianism.42 Or at
least, as a matter of political reality (within the predictive framework),
this philosophy will not be put into practice. Accidents of endowment
or birth still play a large role in determining one's wealth or position
in life. However, it has been noted that many people accept some kind
of specific egalitarianism. That is, certain scarce but basic com-
modities should be distributed more equally than the distribution of
the ability to pay for them. Housing is arguably one of these com-
modities.
The view that housing is a basic commodity which should be dis-
tributed more equally does not necessarily mean everyone is entitled to
live in equally attractive accommodations. It may mean only that
everyone is entitled to a certain minimum quality of housing. This ap-
proach is more in line with the philosophy that inequality is accept-
able so long as no one is living in poverty.43 The problem is defining
the fundamental needs which society should ensure are met and also
the level to which they should be met.
With respect to shelter, if one accepts that everyone is entitled to a cer-
tain minimum standard of habitability and a certain minimum level
of rights which includes security of tenure, then government action
would be justified to give effect to such fundamental needs. One does
not have to favour general egalitarianism or even specific
egalitarianism (for housing) in order to justify a certain minimum
level of protection for tenants. The main ethical argument would be
over the extent of the protection, not over whether there should be any
or not.
Shelter may be seen as a fundamental need which society should as-
sist people to obtain, or even ensure that they do. To go one step fur-
ther, the fundamental need may be defined as reasonably adequate
accommodation. This would mean looking at the quality of housing.
Two major aspects of quality for rental housing are habitability (physi-
cal features, condition of repair, etc.) and security of tenure.
42. Hulchanski, supra note 15 at 59 and Stanbury, supra, note 3 at 3-13.
43. Stanbury, supra, note 3 at 3-14.
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Before considering the significance of security of tenure, several addi-
tional ethical rationales should be noted. One is expressed in general
terms by the Ontario Law Reform Commission's call for a legal
philosophy based on a theory of vital interests. 44 This may be seen in
narrow terms as a version of recognizing fundamental needs or it may
be seen in broader terms as recognizing and balancing the parties'
legitimate interests.45 Security of tenure is definitely a vital or
legitimate interest If unregulated market forces do not lead to any
meaningful kind of security of tenure for tenants (such as through
negotiated contractual options to renew or other guarantees of con-
tinuing tenure), then the government may be justified in taking action.
This may depend on the other legitimate interests which may be af-
fected, such as the landlord's private property rights.
Another ethical rationale for action is the general vague belief that the
government should protect the weakA6 As noted in the discussion
within the economic framework, tenants are in a much weaker bar-
gaining position and many likely would not be able to secure the basic
attributes of good accommodation through negotiation.
A further ethical rationale stems from the view that the government
should seek to protect reasonable expectations and reliance in contrac-
tual and other relationships.47 This rationale would justify having
statutorily implied terms, but this rationale alone would not justify a
prohibition from waiving or contracting out of these terms. The protec-
tion of reasonable expectations and reliance through implied terms
(that can be expressly varied) may also be favoured by economists as a
means of making exchanges more efficient in the marketplace.
44. O.L.R.C. supra, note 29 at 10.
45. Ibid. at 9. See also Ontario, Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations,
Policy Options for Continuing Tenant Protection (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1978)
at 4; L.R.C. of B.C., supra, note 28 at 62. It is noted that a 'secure home is a
fundamental need'.
46. J. lowell, "Comment - Landlord and Tenant Relations - Rent Withholding in
Ontario: a Case-Study and Suggestions for Legislation" (1970) 48 Can. Bar
Rev. 323 at 336.
47. Fram, supra, note I at Al. See also Ontario, The Commission of Inquiry into
Residential Tenancies, Security of Tenure by S.M. Makuch & A. Weinrib
(Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1984) at 5.
Rationales for Tenant Protection
A combination of these rationales of protecting vital interests, weaker
parties and reasonable expectations can be seen to underlie the
modem government's legislation in areas such as consumer protection,
occupational health and safety, employment standards and family law.
In the employment and family contexts, the element of a long-term
relationship is significant Legislation in these areas, as in landlord
and tenant law, should seek to preserve the relationship.4 Further-
more, it has been argued that once such an important relationship is
started, the stronger party may have some continuing obligation to
satisfy not just the needs of the weaker party, but perhaps even its ex-
pectations.49
C. SECURITY OF TENURE
Security of tenure for a tenant means security from being forced to
leave, whether the reason is the landlord's threats, the expiry of the
lease, a court order, an unaffordable rent increase or intolerable living
conditions. There are many reasons why tenants should have some
form of security of tenure, on ethical grounds if not on economic
grounds. Security of tenure is a crucial part of adequate accommoda-
tion. A person's accommodation is his or her home. As mentioned
earlier, there is a great psychological interest attached to one's home.
The losses (in the widest sense) caused by moving, especially if in-
voluntary, can be very substantial. Security of tenure has been com-
pared to security in employment and in marriage, two other
significant, personal and long-term relationships.50
Security of tenure for homeowners is often taken for granted. Aside
from rare instances of expropriation, a homeowner is basically safe
from involuntary eviction as long as the mortgage, if any, is paid ac-
cording to schedule. It has been argued that tenants should have rights
48. Honor, supra, note 23 at 95. See also J. de Klerk, "Section 96: Tenant's
Perspective" in Law Society of Upper Canada, Department of Education,
Residential Tenancies (Toronto: LSUC, 1985) at C2.
49. Ibid at 96.
50. Ibid. See also Security of Tenure (Alberta), supra, note 19 at 6; Makuch, supra,
note 47 at 8; de Klerk, supra, note 48 at C2; Reid, supra, note 32 at 1; L.R.C. of
B.C., supra, note 28; and Canadian Council on Social Development, Is There a
Case for Rent Control? (Background Papers and Proceedings). (Ottawa: CCSD,
1973) at 108.
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similar to those of homeowners.51 The basis of this view rests in the
recognition that tenancy is a regular and long-term mode of accom-
modation for many people.52 It is not always a mere stepping stone to
home ownership. 53
Homeowners do not have absolute security because they must make
payments for taxes, utilities and mortgages at the risk of being dispos-
sessed for failure to do so.54 Interest rate changes are beyond their
control but they can shop around for new mortgages without having to
move.55 More importantly, they cannot be forced out at the whim of
someone else.
It has been noted that being evicted without cause can lead to a loss of
self-worth.56 Security of tenure can be seen as a matter of human dig-
nity and something that reduces the status gap between landlord and
tenant.5 7 It would be difficult to feel good about your accommodation
if the landlord had total arbitrary power over how long you could live
there. Lack of security of tenure may have far-reaching effects in a
manner similar to lack of control and participation in other important
areas.58  Tenants may feel more hostile and alienated towards
landlords and society because they have no protection and no stake in
the community.59 Tenants would be less interested in the condition of
their premises. Furthermore, they will be less likely to enforce their
rights under the lease or under the law if they face arbitrary eviction.
60
Landlords would have monopolistic type of powers if tenants had no
security of tenure. They could extract rents or other benefits beyond
51. Fram, supra, note I at A5. See also: Makuch, supra, note 47 at 12.
52. Fram supra, note 1 at A5.
53. New Zealand Property Law and Equity Reform Committee, Report on Residen-
tial Tenancies (Wellington, New Zealand, 1985) at 7.
54. Makuch, supra, note 47 at 13.
55. Ibid. at 15.
56. M. Gorsky, "An Examination of Some of the Recent Amendments to the On-
tario Landlord and Tenant Act" (1976-77) 3 Dalhousie LJ. 661 at 669.
57. Security of Tenure (Alberta), supra, note 19 at 8, and Canadian Council on So-
cial Development, supra, note 50 at 140.
58. See P. Marcuse, Tenant Participation - For What? (Washington D.C.: The Urban
Institute, 1970) at 15.
59. Security of Tenure (Alberta), supra, note 19 at 2, 8.
60. Ibid. at 2. See also L.R.C. of B.C., supra, note 28 at 63.
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what the market dictated because of a tenant's "irrational" attachment
to his or her home and because of the tenant's other high transaction
costs in moving. Furthermore, landlords who evict tenants for non-
economic reasons such as some personal dislike would be causing un-
productive transaction costs and inefficiency in the market. It has been
suggested that just cause eviction laws benefit everyone because they
force the landlords to be more thoughtful and reasonable.61 But
landlords may also become more selective.
Therefore, the results of not granting to tenants some form of security
of tenure raise economic as well as ethical concerns. The cost-benefit
analysis must look at both frameworks and at all the parties affected,
not just the landlord and the tenant. We will return to such an
analysis in considering various ways in which the government could
grant security of tenure and the evaluation of the alternatives.
5. FORMS OF GOVERNMENT ACTION
In view of the above discussion, it appears that the government should
take some action to assist tenants with respect to the quality of accom-
modation in general, and security of tenure in particular. There are
many different ways in which the governmQnt could act. Some ways
are more interventionist than others. Some actions have a more direct
effect than others. The types of action include the provision or regula-
tion of information, the creation of civil liability rules, the use of taxes
or subsidies, direct regulation or standard-setting and the direct
provision of the product or service by the government.62 One more
possible action is exhortation, negotiation or moral suasion.6 3
In the broad field of rental housing, there are numerous government
policies with many objectives and effects. 64 Some of these policies in-
fluence the behaviour of landlords and tenants (for example, subsidies
for renovations or improvements); other policies involve public hous-
ing or encouraging co-ops (providing alternatives to the private rental
61. Honor supra, note 23 at 116.
62. Dewees, supra, note 5 at 27.
63. Hulchanski, supra, note 15 at 64.
64. See detailed discussion in Chant, supra, note 19 and in Ontario, The Commis-
sion of Inquiry into Residential Tenancies, Government Intervention in Housing
Markets: An Overview by E.B. Adams et al. (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1986).
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market); rent regulation is a controversial and well-known government
action; other interventions involve laws and regulations concerning legal
rights and obligations, zoning by-laws, construction standards, etc. Many
of these policies or actions are not aimed at improving security of tenure
for tenants but they may have varying degrees of indirect impact.
A. PART IV LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT
It is appropriate to begin with a consideration of the government ac-
tion that has the clear objective and direct impact of granting security
of tenure to tenants - this is Part IV of the Landlord and Tenant Act as
(hereinafter the Act) with its provisions governing eviction of residen-
tial tenants.
Prior to the passage of Part IV of this Act in 1970, with amendments
granting substantial security of tenure in 1975,66 the common law did
not offer much protection for tenants. Landlord and tenant law had its
origins in a feudal and agrarian society in which a leasehold estate
was vested in the tenant (granting exclusive possession) in exchange
for rent.67 The land was the important element and the tenant had to
continue paying rent even if the dwelling was unfit for habitation, or
indeed even if it burned down.68 The tenant could be evicted through
the self-help of the landlord if the rent was unpaid, upon the expiry of
the lease or upon giving a certain period of notice in cases of periodic
tenancies.
In modern times, there has been a show recognition that the rigid and
anachronistic principles of land law are totally unsuitable for the
urban apartment rental context in which tenants are more mobile,
more interested in the habitability of the apartment (and not in the
land), more interested in having a secure home and less willing to in-
vest in repairs or upkeep that would primarily benefit the landlord or
future tenants.69 Accordingly, there was a shift to applying contract
65. R.S.O. 1980, c. 232.
66. Hulchanski, supra, note 15 at 74-75, and Fram, supra, note I at A5-A6.
67. Residential Tenancies (Alberta), supra, note 28 at 4. See also discussion of his-
torical origins of the lease in D.R. Stollery, "The Lease as a Contract" (1981)
19 Alta. L. Rev. 234 at 237.
68. Makuch, supra, note 47 at 3; O.L.R.C., supra, note 29 at 10; and Fram, supra,
note I at A2.
69. O.L.R.C., note 29 at 36; Fram, supra, note 1 at A2; and Gautreau, supra, note 15
at 15.
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and tort law so that reasonable expectations and reasonable reliance
could be protected.70 Legislation was needed because the law had
failed to imply into the landlord and tenant relationship those terms
which the vast majority of modem day parties would wish to agree to
and which maximized the combined welfare of the parties.71
Many provisions in the Act affect security of tenure indirectly. Some
of these will be noted later. Other provisions directly grant security of
tenure by imposing the concept of just cause eviction. These
provisions depend on section 121(1), which states:
"Unless a tenant has vacated or abandoned rented premises, the
landlord shall not regain possession of the premises on the grounds
he is entitled to possession except under the authority of a writ of
possession obtained under section 113 or 114."
In other words, a landlord needs a court order to evict a tenant. This
provides the due process guarantee which is so crucial to security of
tenure.
Section 114 concerns situations in which the tenant has given notice of
termination or signed an agreement to terminate. Section 113 is the
main procedural section outlining the process of applying for a writ of
possession.
The Act sets out certain reasons for termination of tenancies, along
with the notice requirements. Section 110 allows termination at the
end of a tenancy period or lease, with proper notice (for example, 60
days for monthly tenancies), on any one of five grounds. Sections 107,
108 and 109 provide additional grounds for eviction. Basically, the
tenancy can be terminated for cause, with respect to the tenant's be-
haviour, for the following reasons:
a. non-payment of rent (but 14 days notice required and tenant
can avoid eviction by paying up before any final judgment);72
b. persistent late payment of rent;73
70. Makuch, supra, note 47 at 3-4; O.L.R.C, supra, note 29 at 10; and Fram, supra,
note I at Al.
71. Fram, supra, note I at A2.
72. Landlord and Tenant Act, supra, note 65, s.108.
73. Ibid. s.110(3)(b).
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c. undue damage to the premises or environs;74
d. illegal act on the premises;75
e. conduct which substantially interferes with reasonable enjoy-
ment of premises by landlord or other tenants;76
f. act or omission which seriously impairs safety or other rights of
other tenants; 77
g. overcrowding in violation of health or safety standards;78 and
h. misrepresentation of income by tenant in subsidized housing.79
Note that reasons c) to f) include actions of the tenant's guests.
The tenancy can also be terminated by the landlord on certain no-
fault grounds, unrelated to the tenant's behaviour:
a. landlord requires possession for occupation by landlord or
landlord's family (60 days notice);80 and
b. landlord requires possession for demolition, conversion to non-
rental residential use or repairs or renovations so extensive as to
require a building permit and vacant possession (120-days
notice).8 1
There are also two more minor reasons specified in s.l10(3) concern-
ing tenants who were provided rental accommodation by their
landlord but whose employment has terminated, and tenants who
rented condominiums they had agreed to buy but whose agreement of
purchase and sale has been terminated. The grounds for eviction set
out above are the only legally recognized ones in Ontario. There have
been suggestions to include more reasons, either related to the tenant's
74. Landlord and Tenant Act, supra, note 65 at s.109(1)(a).
75. Ibid. at s. 109(l)(b).
76. Ibid. at s. 109(1)(c).
77. Ibid. at s. 109(l)(d).
78. Ibid. at s. 109(1)(€).
79. Ibid. at s. 109(l)(O.
80. Ibid. at s. 105.
81. Ibid. at s. 107.
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behaviour (for example, misrepresentation to a prospective buyer)82 or
strictly no-fault reasons (for example, sale by the landlord or necessity
to comply with a health and safety order for vacant possession).83
Another reason could be non-compliance with a material term of the
lease, although this could make security of tenure an illusory right be-
cause leases can be and often are drafted heavily in favour of the
landlord. Alternatively, non-compliance with lease terms could be
made a ground for eviction only with respect to certain terms, such as
those concerning occupancy by children or pets. However, the ex-
clusion of children would now appear to be prohibited by the recent
changes to the Ontario Human Rights Code.84
The effects of limiting eviction to the grounds specified in the Act
should be considered. The reasons which relate to the tenant's own
wrongful action are fairly broad. There may be minor disagreements
over the list but the basic concept is clear - the tenant's security of
tenure is limited to the extent to which the tenant disturbs the enjoy-
ment or safety of other tenants or the landlord, or harms the
landlord's economic interest in the property. The Law Reform Com-
mission of British Columbia has noted that if such a scheme is fairly
and speedily administered, there should be no disadvantage to the
landlord because it is not contrary to its interests to be required to
continue renting to tenants who pay the rent on time, fulfill their
duties and are not destructive.85
However, in reality, landlords complain bitterly about the time and
money that must be spent in going through the legal procedures to ob-
tain an eviction order. Some argue that the difficulty and delay in get-
ting out bad tenants has led to many smaller landlords abandoning
the rental field and many other owners not willing to take the risk.8 6
This lessening of supply in a market already characterized by shortage
82. Makuch, supra, note 47 at 26 and L.R.C. of B.C., supra, note 28 at 66-67.
83. Policy Options, supra, note 45 at 48.
84. Human Rights Code, 1981, S.O. 1981, c. 53, as am. S.O. 1986, c. 64, s. 18(14),
[repealing s. 20(4)1.
85. L.R.C. of B.C., supra, note 28 at 64.
86. See J. Schwartz, "President of the Multiple Dwelling Standards Association"
Toronto Star (7 December 1987); "Woman keeps flat empty to avoid grief"
Toronto Star (26 November 1987); see also: Policy Options, supra, note 45 at 38.
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cannot but have a detrimental effect on tenants.
A further consideration may be that landlords who are frustrated with
the notice and court procedures could try to take the law into their
own hands. Not all tenants will fight back against harassment or un-
lawful eviction. Furthermore, landlords may be more selective in
choosing tenants and some people will have difficulty in renting.
The "no-fault" reasons for termination are possession for own use
(Section 105) and for redevelopment (Section 107). The first reason has
a shorter 60-day notice period in recognition of the vital interest of the
landlord in having the freedom to move into his or her own property
to live in. This encourages owners to rent premises for which they
have no immediate need.87
The redevelopment grounds recognizes the benefits of allowing the
owner to adjust to the markets by demolishing, converting or renovat-
ing the premises whenever the financial incentive exists to do so. This
promotes economic efficiency. Furthermore, as with the first reason
(Section 105), allowing this grounds for termination maintains some
incentive for a property owner to rent because it will not be locked
into the particular rental situation forever. In balancing the owner's in-
terest in control over how to use the property with the tenant's interest
in security of tenure, the Act has provided a longer notice period of
120 days. However, an additional interest in preserving affordable rent-
al housing stock has led to controls on demolition and conversion. In
Ontario, the Rental Housing Protection Acts, 1986 were passed in 1986
and 1989 to give municipalities some power to prevent demolition of
residential rental premises or conversion to condominiums or other
non-rental or non-residential uses.88 These steps have been made
necessarily largely because of rent control making rental housing a
less attractive investment than other forms of real estate use.89
Aside from the provisions of the Landlord and Tenant Act that provide
security of tenure through requiring eviction for cause, there are also
other sections directly protecting security of tenure. Section 95
prohibits the alteration of locks without mutual consent. Section 106
deems a tenancy agreement for a fixed term which expires to be
87. Makuch, supra, note 47 at 28.
88. Rental Housing Protection Act, 1986, S.O. 1986, c. 26; Rental Housing Protection
Act, 1989, S.O. 1989, c. 31.
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renewed as a monthly tenancy agreement upon the same terms. This
reaffirms the right of a tenant to stay on despite the expiry of a lease.
Sections 121(2) and (3) give some discretion to a judge to refuse to
grant the landlord's application for a writ of possession. Furthermore,
Section 121(4) prohibits the landlord from cutting off vital services or
from substantially interfering with the tenant's reasonable enjoyment
with intent to cause the tenant to leave or to refrain from asserting his
or her rights. Section 122 also makes it a provincial offence to know-
ingly contravene certain provisions, including Sections 95 and 121.
Therefore, the law offers some protection against a landlord harassing
a tenant to leave but enforcement may be difficult. Other provisions in
the Act provide more indirect protection of security of tenure. Section-
96 stipulates the landlord's duty to provide and maintain the rented
premises in "a good state of repair and fit for habitation." This duty
can protect a tenant from being forced out through intolerable living
conditions. In addition, there are numerous health and safety stand-
ards, construction standards and occupancy by-laws at the provincial
and municipal levels that further ensure a minimum quality level for
residential accommodation. It has been suggested that these minimum
standards raise costs and reduce and freedom of tenants who prefer
substandard housing or cannot afford anything except substandard
housing.9° While the quality regulation issue of habitability is beyond
the scope of this paper, it should be pointed out that substandard
housing has negative effects beyond the landlord and tenant who are
parties to the tenancy. There may be externalities affecting the
neighbourhood's property values, as well as the health and safety of
the occupants or neighbours.
Another section of the Act which enhances security of tenure is Section
93, which gives the tenant a right to privacy by restricting the
landlord's right to enter the premises. Privacy is an essential com-
ponent of having a secure home.
Section 86 prohibits the landlord from seizing the tenant's goods for
unpaid rent. Section 84 limits the amount of security deposits to one
month's rent. Large security deposits may hinder tenants from being
able to obtain apartments, from moving out or from asserting their
rights.
90. Hayek, supra, note 15 at 41, and Residential Tenancies (Alberta), supra, note 28 at
24-25.
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Another aspect of security of tenure is the "right to assign, sublet or
otherwise part with possession of the rented premises" found in Sec-
tion 91. The tenancy agreement may provide that the consent of the
landlord (not to be unreasonably withheld) is required.
The tenant's interest in assignability of the tenancy is related to
security of tenure if the tenant wants the power to pass on the
premises to his or her family members, or even close friends. This ele-
ment of control or having a stake in the premises can be psychologi-
cally important. Homeowners have no restraints on alienation. Indeed,
if tenants can sell their tenancy to others, then they will have an in-
vestment interest in the property, not just a shelter interest.91 There-
fore, they would be willing to invest more effort and money into their
apartment and treat it like their home. However, this is unlikely to be
acceptable to the landlords. They have an economic interest in who is
living in their premises and perhaps some psychological need to feel
in control of their property.92 Property owners may be discouraged
from renting if these vital interests are not respected. It has been noted
that the tenant should not be provided with a marketable asset.93
However, on balance, it may be justified to allow tenants to transmit
their interest to family members.9 4 Furthermore, in these modem times
of more mobility, it may be justified to allow more freedom for tenants
to sublet or assign their leases of fixed terms in order to give them the
flexibility to move out before their lease has expired.
B. RENT REGULATION
Apart from the Landlord and Tenant Act, rent regulation is a major
area that affects security of tenure. A scheme of security of tenure
needs some form of rent review in order to be effective because other-
wise the landlord could raise rents to prohibitively high levels and
economically evict the tenant. The statutory 90-day notice period for
91. Hulchanski, supra, note 15 at 43-44.
92. New Zealand Property Law and Equity Reform Committee, supra, note 53 at
17.
93. Residential Tenancies (Alberta), supra, note 28 at 139, and Makuch, supra, note
47 at 22. The new Residential Rental Regulation Act, 1986, S.O. 1986, c.63 s.
101(2) contains provisions to prevent tenants from profitting through "key
money" or through subletting at a rent higher than that paid by the tenant to
the landlord.
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rent increases would not give enough security of tenure.95 However, it
has been noted that security of tenure can be protected merely by al-
lowing the tenant to challenge any discriminatory rent increases or in-
creases allegedly aimed at evicting the tenant.96 In other words, the
government does not have to set maximum legal rent levels, unless it
wishes to do so for some other rationale such as protecting affordable
rents.9 7 Furthermore, it is arguable that the security of tenure concern
should not prevent landlords from raising the rent as much as they
want after a tenant has moved out.
On the other hand, it would appear to be ineffective to put the onus
on the tenant to challenge discriminatory rent increases. Studies have
shown a very disproportionate avoidance of the adjudicative system by
tenants98 and security of tenure may become a myth if tenants must
challenge rent increases. It may be that adequate security exists only if
the landlord cannot raise rents beyond a certain minimum percentage
unless a greater increase is supported by the landlord's particular
financial situation. In addition, allowing landlords to raise rents freely
after a tenant has moved out may offer too much incentive to
landlords to evict tenants by legal or illegal means in order to raise the
rent
Many other government policies may affect security of tenure indirect-
ly by affecting the supply of housing.100 Low vacancy rates affect to
some extent the relative bargaining power of tenants and the monopo-
95. See Residential Rent Regulation Act, 1986, supra, note 93, s. 5 and Landlord and
Tenant Act, supra, note 65, s. 129.
96. Makuch, supra, note 47 at 18-20. See also Residential Tenancies (Alberta), supra,
note 28 at 135 and L.R.C. of B.C. supra, note 28.
97. The issue of rent control and its various rationales, costs and benefits is very
interesting and has been the subject of much commentary but, as noted pre-
viously, it is not within the scope of this paper.
98. See criticism of overjudicialization in S.R. Fodden, "Landlord and Tenant and
Law Reform" (1974) 12 Osgoode Hall LJ. 44, and in D.L. Martin, "Civil
Remedies Available to Residential Tenants in Ontario: The Case for Assertive
Action." (1976) 14 Osgoode Hall L. 65, 91. Fodden's article presents a detailed
look at landlord and tenant actions commenced in Ontario in 1970 to 1973.
The lack of access by tenants is demonstrated in the statistic that under 1 per
cent of these actions were initiated by the tenant and 2/3 of the actions in-
volved no appearance by the tenant.
99. See Chant, supra, note 19, and Adams, supra, note 64.
100. Canadian Council on Social Development, supra, note 50 at 108.
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listic power of landlords which enables them to evict tenants and then
find new tenants without too much difficulty or economic hardship.
There are many government policies or programs that provide sub-
sidies for the construction or creation of rental housing. Other govern-
ment action involves public housing, subsidized housing and co-ops
which all provide feasible alternative for tenants.101
C. INDIRECT WAYS
Other indirect ways of increasing security of tenure may be to supple-
ment the tenant's income through shelter allowances or other income
redistribution policies. This could help a tenant to withstand rent in-
creases and not be forced to move out 102 However, having more
money cannot by itself be relied upon to provide sufficient security of
tenure. A tenant cannot buy his or her way out of every situation in-
volving a capricious landlord.
Some creative alternatives come to light when the nature of the market
failures is recalled - unequally high transaction costs for the tenant
and weaker bargaining power. At a minimal level, the government
could assist the tenant who is hunting for an apartment by providing
assistance and complete information on vacancies and comparable
rents. It could even compel the landlords to furnish such information
to the government.
The tenant's high transaction costs could be remedied by compensat-
ing the tenant for moving so that his or her mobility and freedom to
choose the best deal will be increased. However, whether the govern-
ment or the landlord compensates the tenant for moving, there may be
inefficiency in wasted expenses from encouraging too much moving. If
the landlord must pay compensation for terminating the tenancy
through no fault of the tenant, these extra costs may result in fewer
terminations (and therefore more security of tenure) but also in higher
rent, less repair or less supply of rental housing.
To address the issue of unequal bargaining power, some study has
been made of having a collective bargaining system for landlords and
tenants, similar to the labour relations context. 103 But this may not be
101. Chant, supra, note 19 at 223.
102. Reid, supra, note 32.
Rationales for Tenant Protection
workable or politically feasible.
Other even more radical alternatives would arise from the logical ex-
tensions of the view that good housing is a fundamental right. Since
the landlord can affect a tenant's life in such a close personal way, the
government could try to license landlords - that is, license the input
This could also involve training (for example, sensitization to the poor
and minorities) and conditions of licence. If a licence is revoked, the
government could step in and manage the rental premises. Indeed, the
government could decide to create a monopoly and administer all
rental housing while leaving the ownership of the capital in private
hands. The extreme would be for government to abolish the concept of
private rental housing altogether and provide government housing to
everyone who could not afford to buy a home (assuming such a
government would still allow private property).
6. CONCLUSION
As we can see, there are many possible forms of government action
that can be taken to meet the objective of providing security of tenure.
This objective is mainly a social one, not an economic one, although
there are economic benefits as well.
From a market viewpoint, security of tenure can help to promote more
rational action by landlords when evicting tenants and less vandalism
by tenants. There is also some economic value to the social benefits of
happier and more secure tenants. On the other hand, there are nega-
tive economic impacts from having more costs and less flexibility to
change tenants or redevelop the property for economic reasons.
Security of tenure may be seen as an extra commodity which the law
forces the landlord to supply.1 4 It is arguable that the costs of supply-
ing this protection are not substantial in many cases. But, to the extent
that costs are incurred, the landlord may respond by increasing the
rent, decreasing expenditure on repair and maintenance, or withdraw-
ing from the rental housing market. It is difficult to speculate on these
103. W.Z. Hirsch, "Landlord-Tenant Relations Law," in P. Burrows & CJ. Vel-
janouski, eds., The Economic Approach to Law (London: Butterworths, 1981) 277
at 297; excerpt in MJ. Trebilcock, Social Regulation, (Toronto: Osgoode Hall
Law School, 1987).
104. Ibid. See also Knetsch, supra, note 19 at 5.
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costs and these costs and the effect on rents, maintenance levels or
supply.105
The cost-benefit analysis within the economic framework may show
some loss of efficiency or welfare maximization. However, the rental
housing market is a very complex one. The failures involving high
transaction costs and weaker bargaining powers for tenants lead to
some monopolistic power for landlords. In the economic perspective,
these failures may not be properly remedied by granting security of
tenure to tenants. But in the ethical framework, a strong case has been
made for this kind of tenant protection. Where the unregulated market
does not lead to ethically acceptable results, the government must in-
tervene.
The government has already infringed substantially on private proper-
ty rights, which are themselves made possible only through govern-
ment. There are many laws regarding zoning, property and occupancy
standards, taxation and so forth. The government has also acted to
protect weaker parties, especially in long-term relationships which
have a direct, substantial and personal impact on the weaker party,
such as marriage or employment. Society may believe in housing as a
fundamental need or in a stronger view of egalitarianism, or just
generally in the protection of legitimate interests and reasonable ex-
pectations. In any event, there is a strong ethical rationale for govern-
ment action to protect tenants and, specifically, to grant security of
tenure.
105. New Zealand Equity and Property Law Refore Committee, supra, note 53 at 16
and Security of Tenure (Alberta), supra, note 19 at 11.
